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a

INTRODUCTION
Brailsford uses an overly simplistic analysis to support his contention that
Fetter, as a guarantor of certain tenant obligations under the subject Lease
Agreement ("the lease"), is liable for the restaurant exhaust system at issue in this
case. The mere fact the tenant had certain obligations under the lease does not
mean Fetter, as a guarantor, is automatically liable for all of those obligations.
The tenant obligations Fetter guaranteed are not as broad as Brailsford has
argued. The guaranteed obligations are clearly defined and do not include the
alleged obligation that is the subject matter of this action.

The lease clearly

delineates the improvements that were to be paid for by the landlord and the
improvements that were to be paid for by the tenant. Fetter only guaranteed the
items on the "Paid by Tenant" list set forth in Exhibit "B" to the lease. The "Paid
by Tenant" list does not include payment for the exhaust system's equipment and
installation expense.
The fact Fetter did not guaranty the payment of rent is an additional defense
against liability. The lease was written to include an increase in the monthly rental
payments so that the landlord could cover the expense it incurred in installing the
exhaust system. Payment for the exhaust system was characterized as rent under
the lease and Fetter clearly did not guarantee the tenant's rental obligations. Even
Brailsford has not argued that Fetter guaranteed the tenants' obligation to pay rent.
1

Brailsford's brief also ignores the strict ailes of construction applicable to
guaranty agreements. In the present matter, in order for Fetter to be held liable for
the exhaust system, those strict rules of construction would have to be utterly
disregarded.
Brailsford also incorrectly argues that Fetter's argument regarding offsets is
being raised for the first time on appeal. Offsets is listed as an affirmative defense
in Fetter's answer to the amended complaint. R. at p. 113. The issue of offsets
was also raised in connection with Brailsford's motion for summary judgment in
the trial court. See id. at pp. 231-239, 241-242, 273-280.
Finally, Fetter has not waived his right to argue the application of the
surrender and acceptance doctrine in this matter.

Although surrender and

acceptance is not specifically raised as an affirmative defense in Fetter's answer to
the amended complaint, Brailsford never objected to the defense until now. See id.
at pp. 273-280. Furthermore, the monthly payments for the exhaust system were
specifically defined as rent. Therefore, the doctrine of surrender and acceptance
applies even under Brailsford's argument that the doctrine is applicable only to
rental obligations.

In any event, the fact of the matter is that the premises,

including the subject exhaust system, were returned to the landlord. The exhaust
system has been used by subsequent restaurant businesses.

Under basic legal

principles such as the duty to mitigate and the prohibition against double recovery,
2

Fetter should not be required to pay the balance for the exhaust system, even if the
court determines Fetter guaranteed payment for the exhaust system.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
IF ANYTHING, FETTER ONLY
GUARANTEED THE "PAID BY TENANT"
ITEMS OF EXHIBIT "B55 TO THE LEASE
The express provisions of the subject Guaranty of Certain Lease Obligations
("the guaranty55) provides that Fetter and his co-guarantor were only guaranteeing
"all improvements to the leased premises to be paid by Tenant."

R. at 198

(emphasis added).1 The fact that the guaranty refers to improvements "to be paid
by Tenant55 is critical to the analysis of this case because the parties specifically
defined in the lease which obligations belonged to the landlord and which
obligations belonged to the tenant.
Clearly, the language of the guaranty relates back to Exhibit "B" to the lease
which contains two separate lists itemizing the improvements to be paid by the
landlord and the improvements to be paid by the tenant.

The "PAID BY

Specifically, the guaranty states: "the undersigned Guarantors hereby
guarantee to Landlord the fiill and prompt payment of all costs and expenses
incurred in connection with the design, construction and installation to all
improvements to the Leased premises to be paid by Tenant, and the performance of
all of Tenant's other duties and obligations set forth in Sections 12 and 14 of the
Lease.55 R. at 198. The guaranty is limited. It is not unconditional as argued by
Brailsford.
3

TENANT" portion of Exhibit "B" lists eleven separate items that were to be paid
for by the tenant. Id. at 196. With respect to the subject exhaust system, Exhibit
"B" states that the tenant was only obligated to pay for the "design of make up air
and exhaust system." Id. (emphasis added). The tenant list does not include the
cost of the exhaust system equipment and/or installation.

That expense is

specifically included on the landlord's list. Id. at 195. Yet, this is the amount
Brailsford attempts to recover from Fetter as a guarantor. Simply stated, because
the "PAID BY TENANT" list itself does not include the obligation for payment of
the exhaust system, it is axiomatic that Fetter did not personally guarantee it. This
is clear if the lease and the guaranty are read in context with each other.
Ignoring the relationship between the guaranty and the subject lease
agreement, Brailsford argues broadly that because the exhaust system was an
improvement benefiting the tenant, Fetter guaranteed it.

Not only does this

argument disregard the clear language of the lease and the guaranty, it is also
contrary to the authorities cited by Fetter in its opening brief that a guaranty
agreement must be strictly construed. See Carrier Brokers, Inc. v. Spanish Trail
761 P. 2d 258, 261 (Utah App. 1998) (citing Valley Bank & Trust v. Rite Way
Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105, 110 (Utah App. 1997). In fact, Bradford's
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brief does not challenge the application of the principle that guaranty contracts
must be construed strictly.
The guaranty also states that Fetter and his co-guarantor were guaranteeing
the tenant's obligations under Section 12 of the lease. R. at p. 198.3 Brailsford,
rather than aclaiowledging the limitations of this obligation, argues that the
obligations under Section 12 of the lease broadly cover any and all tenant
obligations - not just those obligations referenced in and limited by Exhibit "B" to
the lease. Brailsford's position is inaccurate. The only logical way to read Section
12 is that it refers back to Exhibit U B" to the lease which, as stated above, contains
two separate lists: one for improvements to be paid for by the landlord and one for
improvements to be paid for by the tenant. To quote the language in Section 12
directly: 'Tenant shall be responsible, and shall pay the full cost for all other
improvements to the premises, as shown and described on attached Exhibit "Z?"

Even in a case relied upon by Brailsford, the court stated that the guaranty
"depends upon the nature of the guarantor's promise." Strevall-Patterson Co, v.
Francis, 646 P.2d 741, 743 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted).
The guaranty also states the guarantors guaranteed tenant obligations
under Section 14 of the lease. Fetter contends Section 14 is not at issue in this case
because it relates to the tenant's obligations to pay for subsequent alterations to the
premises. R. at 179-180. The subject exhaust system was not an alteration.
Section 14.3 of the lease does refer back to the guaranty signed by Fetter and his
co-guarantor. However, that reference does not create any additional liability. As
argued in Point 1 herein, the guaranty is limited to those items set forth in the
"PAID BY TENANT" list of Exhibit "B" to the lease.
5

("Tenant's Improvements")."

R. at 178 (emphasis added). Because Section 12

merely refers back to Exhibit U B," which does not contain the exhaust system in
the "PAID BY TENANT" list, any argument Fetter guaranteed payment for the
exhaust system fails.
POINT 2.
FETTER DID NOT GUARANTY
THE PAYMENT OF RENT
The lease reveals the tenant agreed to pay an additional amount of rent, for a
five-year period, to cover the expense of the exhaust system, which was paid for
initially by the landlord. Although Brailsford calls this obligation a "loan," there is
no promissory note evidencing any separate loan obligation. It was an obligation
under the lease defined as rent. Under Section 5 of the lease, which sets for the
base rent terms, there are two columns setting forth annual rent and monthly rent.
The lease states that "[t]hese amounts [referring to the base rent amounts] will
increase to include amortization of the cost of the [exhaust system] over a 5-year
period, with interest at 8%." R. at 175. In other words, the additional amount paid
TA r

f V* o

o v l i m i p f

m r c f - c * r v \ in

in r\i~ 1* a. T O r*r* o r\

4r\

on

o n ^ /-f 1~\ 11^» rr

r ^ f l - i o v "fKoi^v v a n f

JLKJI uiv^ t A i i a u o i ojyoiv^iii 10 n u t i v i ^ i i v u LU a o c l i i ^ u i i n g , VJUA^I m a n

4

ltui.

The "PAID BY LANDLORD" list contained in Exhibit "B" to the lease
clarifies that the amounts paid by the tenant to cover the exhaust system cost was
classified as rent: "[exhaust system] for kitchen...to be installed by Tenant, but
cost of equipment and installation financed by Landlord and repaid through rent"
R. at 195 (emphasis added).
6

Not only did Fetter not personally guarantee the exhaust system, he did not
guarantee the payment of rent.5 Because the payment for the exhaust system was
classified by the parties as rent, Fetter is not liable for that expense under the
guaranty.6
POINT 3.
FETTER HAS NOT WAIVED THE DEFENSE
OF SURRENDER AND ACCEPTANCE
Fetter acknowledges his answer to the amended complaint does not
specifically contain an affirmative defense defined as "surrender and acceptance."
However, the issue was raised during the summary judgment phase of this lawsuit.
See R. at 273-280. Brailsford never challenged Fetter's reliance upon that doctrine
during the summary judgment proceedings.

5

It is noteworthy that despite Brailsford's attempt to have the guaranty
construed broadly, he has not argued that Fetter guaranteed the payment of rent.
6

Brailsford tries to make a big deal out of the fact a separate amortization
schedule was prepared for repayment of the exhaust system and that separate
checks were paid for the exhaust system portion of the rental payments. First,
Brailsford's prior counsel has already represented on the record that the fact
separate checks were written "really doesn't matter." R. at 433 (p. 31).
Additionally, Fetter has explained the reason why separate checks were written.
There were ongoing disputes concerning which party was responsible to pay for
what mechanical improvements. Fetter created an amortization schedule and wrote
separate checks for accounting purposes. R. at 201-202. Brailsford cannot make
the leap that because separate checks may have been written, Fetter guaranteed
those payments. The amortized payments for the exhaust system were defined as
rental payments no matter how the payments were made.
7

It is well settled in Utah that the failure to include a defense in the pleadings
is not necessarily fatal. See F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670,
671 (Utah 1965) ("this rule is not so sacrosanct as to be inviolable"). "If the
interests of justice so require and the opposing party is given fair opportunity to
meet such a defense, the trial court may permit the issue to be tried." Id. See also
Olpin v. Grove Fin. Co., 521 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Utah 1974).
In the present matter, the surrender and acceptance issue was placed on the
table long ago, and without any prior argument by Brailsford that it had been
waived because it was not specifically set forth in the pleadings. Brailsford, by its
failure to object until now, has essentially acquiesced and the issue is appropriate
for consideration on appeal.
POINT 4.
THE DOCTRINE OF SURRENDER
AND ACCEPTANCE IS APPLICABLE
Brailsford argues the doctrine of surrender and acceptance is inapplicable to
this case because the subject obligation is not rent. However, as argued in Point 2
above, a clear reading of the lease reveals that if anything, the tenant's obligation
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to pay for the exhaust system over time was classified as rent.

Because the

obligation is classified as rent, the doctrine of surrender and acceptance applies.
In any event, the overriding concern is Brailsford's apparent attempt to
avoid the consequences of the landlord's duty to mitigate damages and the
prohibition against double recovery.

Brailsford's argument that the tenant

continued to be liable for the payment of rent following the termination of the lease
ignores the landlord's duty to mitigate damages. Brailsford also fails to readily
acknowledge that at some point, the premises were relet to a new restaurant
operator. Despite this, Brailsford contends that the tenant remained liable for the
full, unpaid balance of the exhaust system, even when the premises were relet to a
third party.
At a minimum, even if the tenant remained liable, and assuming Fetter was
liable as a guarantor, there are certainly fact questions concerning the amount of
liability. Despite this, the trial court simply entered judgment for the full balance
of the cost of the exhaust system without considering the impact of the landlord's
duty to mitigate, double recovery concerns and Fetter's claim for offsets.

The surrender and acceptance cases cited by Brailsford in his brief agree
that the doctrine works to excuse liability for rent accruing after the surrender and
acceptance occurs. See Nicholas A. Cutaia, Inc. v. Buyer's Bazaar, Inc., 224 A.D.
2d 952 (N.Y. App. 1996); Peterson v. Hodges, 239 P.2d 180 (Utah 1951).
9

POINT 5.
FETTER'S CLAIM FOR OFFSET
WAS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
Fetter's defense of offset was specifically set forth in his answer to the
amended complaint. R. at 113. Furthermore, the issue was debated during the
summary judgment proceedings in the trial court. See id. at 231-239, 241-242,
273-280. The issue of offset is appropriately before this court for consideration.
Additionally, at a minimum, because there are questions of fact surrounding the
offset issue, it was improper for the trial court to enter summary judgment
concerning the amount of liability.
CONCLUSION
This court should reverse the trial court's summary judgment against Fetter.
Reading the lease and the guaranty in conjunction with each other reveals that
while Fetter guaranteed the tenant's obligations specifically defined in the lease, he
did not guarantee the payment for the exhaust system. Additionally, the guaranty
did not cover the rental payments that were designed to cover the landlord's
expense for the exhaust system. Brailsford's broad argument that Fetter is liable
for each and every obligation the tenant had under the lease is incorrect. Fetter
only guaranteed those items referenced in the guaranty, which must be strictly
construed.

In short, Fetter's guaranty obligation extended only to the items

contained on the "PAID BY TENANT" list in Exhibit U B" to the lease.
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